Today I am at Duke to participate in a conference on “Conservative Visions of Our Environmental Future,” sponsored by the Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Nicholas School for the Environment, Duke Federalist Society, Duke College Republicans and the Energy & Enterprise Initiative. The conference is being live streamed here, and I’ll be offering comments on the proceedings below. [Read more…]
Last term, in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s effort to deny private landowners an opportunity to challenge the agency’s assertion of jurisdiction over their land. The Sacketts wanted to build a home in a subdivision, but the EPA concluded the Sacketts’ land to contain jurisdictional wetlands under the Clean Water Act and issued an order requiring the Sacketts to cease construction of their home and undertake specified restoration efforts. Failure to comply with the order was itself punishable with substantial fines, in addition to any for violating the CWA. The Sacketts sought judicial review of the order, on both statutory and constitutional grounds, to no avail in the lower courts. They prevailed in the Supreme Court, however, completely on statutory grounds, leaving the due process questions to another day.
The Court based its decision on the Administrative Procedure Act’s presumption in favor of judicial review of final agency actions and the CWA’s failure to expressly preclude such review. But what if the CWA had precluded review? Would the Sacketts have been entitled to judicial review under the Due Process Clause? And more broadly, given the uncertainty surrounding the scope of federal wetland regulation, and the lack of fully enforceable jurisdictional regulations, does current CWA enforcement more generally comport with the principles of due process? I explore some of these questions in a forthcoming article in the Cato Supreme Court Review, “Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due Process Deficit in Environmental Law.” The abstract is below.
In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency a unanimous Supreme Court held that private landowners could seek judicial review of an Administrative Compliance Order issued by the Environmental Protection Agency alleging that their land contained wetlands subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act. The Court’s decision rested on statutory grounds, but the same result may have been dictated by principles of due process. Under the CWA, federal regulators have asserted authority over waters and dry lands alike and sought to expand federal jurisdiction well beyond constitutional limits. Under existing regulations, landowners have little notice or certainty as to whose lands are covered, under what authority, or with what effect. As a consequence, federal wetlands regulations, as currently practiced, violates important due process principles.
Cross-posted at The Volokh Conspiracy.
Earlier this month, several of the parties challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act filed petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit turned away all of the state and industry challenges to the EPA’s rules. I summarized the court’s decision here, and provide greater background on the EPA’s regulations and associated policy issues here.
The en banc petitions stress the unusual magnitude and importance of the regulations at issue, as well they should, but that’s often not enough for en banc review. Nor are protestations that the original panel muffed the merits (case in point), particularly where (as here) most of the issues could be resolved on traditional administrative law grounds. The industry argument that the panel erred in refusing to force the EPA to consider potential adaptation to climate change, for example, is a non-starter. Even if the panel got this question wrong (and I don’t believe it did), that’s not the sort of question that is worthy of en banc review.
There is one issue, however, that could well be en banc-worthy: the panel’s conclusion that industry petitioners lacked standing to challenge the EPA’s so-called “tailoring rule.” While the strict application of Article III standing requirements is nothing new on the D.C. Circuit, here the panel applied the standing rules to prevent the object of a government action from challenging the lawfulness of that action, on the grounds that the harm would not be redressable by a favorable ruling on the merits. Though a plausible reading of the relevant standing precedents, this is a holding that could insulate all manner of regulatory action from judicial review, and expand the already troubling, de facto agency authority to issue “waivers” or otherwise disregard applicable legal requirements.
A bit of background: The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to impose various regulatory requirements on stationary sources that have the potential to emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year of regulated pollutants. (The specific threshold depends on the type of facility.) As applied to traditional pollutants, these thresholds catch thousands of facilities. But applied to greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide in particular — they catch millions. This, the EPA claims, would be an “absurd” result because it would impose an insuperable burden on the EPA and cooperating state agencies. To remedy this, the EPA sought to “tailor” the Act’s requirements by substituting numerical thresholds of its own devising for those contained in the statute itself. So with a wave of its administrative hand, the EPA substituted 75,000 and 100,000 for 100 and 250, and reserved the right to lower the threshold at its discretion in the future. [Read more…]
by Andy Hanssen, PERC Lone Mountain Fellow
What Naomi Lamoreaux has termed “The Mystery of Property Rights” has two aspects. On the one hand, secure and stable property rights are essential to economic development and growth. On the other hand, a set of property rules that cannot evolve in the face of technological and social change may be unable to adapt in ways that facilitate progress.
In this context, consider the United States. The United States is an economically successful country with well-respected enforcement of property rights – so much so that it serves as a destination for capital fleeing less stable regimes. Yet the United States also has a record of making abrupt alterations to property rights (creating losers as well as winners) in the face of new technologies and/or the availability of new resources.
When a parcel of land is taken via eminent domain for a “public use,” its owners are entitled to “just compensation.” These two requirements (public use and just compensation) are written into the U.S. federal constitution and the constitutions of most states, and ostensibly check the ability of governments to take private property. In fact, each requirement has proven sufficiently malleable so as to allow a broad range of takings. Although debates over the proper definition of public use have generated controversy, unhappiness with how just compensation is determined has also sparked much concern. That unhappiness became particularly pronounced in the 19th century when a practice known as the benefit offset was employed (see Fleck and Hanssen 2010).
The idea behind the benefit offset is simple: If an owner has land taken for a public use via eminent domain and the value of the remaining land rises as a result, the taker can “offset” required compensation by that rise in value. For example, assume a farmer loses 10 of his 100 acres to a railroad, the pre-railroad price of farmland is $100 per acre, and the price rises to $105 per acre when the railroad lays its line. The farmer is due compensation equal to $1000 (10 x $100) for taken land, less $450 (90 x $5) for the increase in the value of the remaining land, summing to a net payment of $550.
The benefit offset was one of several “expediting doctrines” used to promote public infrastructure projects – highways and canals – in the early 19th century. The “expediting” was justified by the alleged importance of the projects to the general public.
The benefit offset was also used to subsidize railroad building. Why subsidize railroads, and if doing so, why use the benefit offset?
Various explanations for a subsidy are possible, but holdup problems were likely to have been of concern. Infrastructure projects entail large sunk investments, with returns generated over a period of years. Nonetheless, the benefit offset seems a roundabout form of dealing with a holdup problem. One possible explanation is that the benefit offset enhances the incentive to choose the most valuable route (in terms of willingness of shippers to pay).
Rail rates (as with rates for canals or highways) were regulated, which may have prevented companies from capturing the full value of a line through pricing (this would be a form of holdup). As a result, a rail company will choose the cost-minimizing route, which may not be the value-maximizing route as landowners are concerned. The benefit offset may have helped overcome this problem.
As Lone Mountain Fellows at PERC this summer, Robert Fleck and I are taking a closer look at this issue. By examining how the benefit offset was used and when it changed in different states, we highlight factors that underline the adaptability of property rules—but which don’t threaten the security promised by the property regime.
Andy Hanssen is a 2012 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow and an associate professor of economics at Clemson University. He is the co-author, along with Robert Fleck, of the 2007 PERC Policy Series “Do Profits Promote Pollution? The Myth of the Environmental Race to the Bottom.”
Sackett v. EPA was the big environmental case from this past Supreme Court term, but the Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, the health care case, could actually turn out to have the larger effect on environmental law. While most commentators on NFIB focused on the Commerce Clause challenge to the individual mandate, the arguments against the health care reform law’s provisions expanding Medicaid turned out to be more consequential, as seven justices concluded that in trying to create incentives for states to expand Medicaid, the health care reform law went too far. This aspect of the Court’s ruling could also have a significant impact on environmental law.
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Congress sought to expand Medicaid to cover all adults at or below 133 percent of the poverty line. As states are tasked with implementing Medicaid, Congress had to make it worth their while. So in addition to offering generous funding (at least in the beginning), the PPACA also threatened to cut off all Medicaid funding to any state that did not go along with the expansion. In effect, Congress made the states an offer they couldn’t refused, which is one reason over twenty states sued.
In NFIB a majority of the Supreme Court found Congress’ offer to be unconstitutional. Congress’ use of conditional spending, seven justices concluded, crossed the line from inducement to coercion, and was constitutionally impermissible. In the process, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution creates a federal government of limited and enumerated powers, and that the federal government’s spending power is subject to judicially enforceable limits.
The NFIB ruling matters for environmental law because conditional spending is a staple of modern environmental law. Most of the major federal environmental statutes adopt a “cooperative federalism” model under which states are encouraged to implement federal environmental programs. State cooperation is encouraged through, among other things, the promise of federal financial support and, in some cases, the threat to withhold money for other programs. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, states that fail to adopt federally approved air pollution control programs risk losing federal highway funding. This condition, combined with the threat of direct federal regulation, has been largely successful at inducing state acquiescence. Yet after the Supreme Court’s NFIB decision, this arrangement may be unconstitutional.
The Clean Air Act would appear potentially vulnerable on several grounds. First, the Clean Air Act conditions the receipt of money for one program (highway construction) on compliance with conditions tied to a separate program (air pollution control). This may be problematic because a majority of the Court thought Congress was trying to leverage state reliance on funding for one program (traditional Medicaid) to induce participation in another program (the Medicaid expansion). While the money at stake under the Clean Air Act is far less – most states receive substantially less in highway funds than in Medicaid funds – highway funding is less directly related to air pollution control (particularly from stationary sources) than traditional Medicaid is to the Medicaid expansion.
Though highway funding is less than that for Medicaid, it still may be enough to raise constitutional concerns. Highway funds are raised from a dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway Trust Fund. For many states, federal highway funds represent the lion’s share of their transportation budget. As a consequence, threatening to take highway funds may strike some courts as unduly coercive under NFIB. In the 1980s the Supreme Court upheld conditioning five percent of a state’s highway funds on setting a 21-years-old drinking age. Under the Clean Air Act, however, a state can lose all highway funds, save those that will reduce emissions or are necessary for traffic safety, for failure to adopt a complete pollution control plan that satisfies the federal EPA.
The Court in NFIB also stressed that conditional grants of federal funds operate much like a contract, and that the parties are limited in their ability to unilaterally revise the terms. This could expose another vulnerability in the Clean Air Act because while the statutory requirements don’t regularly change, what states must actually do to comply with the Clean Air Act’s terms do. The requirements for state pollution control plans are constantly changing, as the EPA tightens or otherwise revises federal air quality standards and additional pollutants become subject to Clean Air Act regulation. Were this not enough, the recent inclusion of greenhouse gases as pollutants subject to regulation under the Act has radically altered states’ obligations, such that states will now have to do many things they could not have anticipated when the Clean Air Act was last revised in 1990.
Many states are already chafing under the Clean Air Act’s requirements. The NFIB decision may give them a tool to relieve the burden. Specifically, the Court’s decision to limit the federal government’s authority to place conditions on the receipt of federal funds may offer states some relief from Clean Air Act requirements.
Denis and Barbara Prager fear the day that hydraulic fracturing takes place on their land in the Shields Valley of Montana. The threat of ‘fracking’ is real and there is nothing they can do. While the Prager’s own the surface rights to their property, the state owns the subsurface and mineral rights. The state has the right to use the land as is ‘reasonably necessary’ for drilling or can lease the mineral rights to a private company. Those rights are presently open for bid.
Hundreds of millions of acres of property across the nation have secure property rights that are split; different entities own the surface and subsurface rights. Battles over split estate rights emphasize the importance of well specified and defined rights. Perhaps most important is the knowledge of what rights the surface owner does and does not have.
Under split estate rules, subsurface owners have the right to use surface land as is ‘reasonably necessary’ to develop subsurface assets. Private oil and gas companies often lease rights from subsurface owners regardless of whether the estate is split or under single ownership. Either way, drilling and extraction companies are responsible for unnecessary harm done, impacting water quality, for example.
Though hydraulic fracturing has been going on for more than 60 years, it has gained recent attention due to its affordability in the current global economic and technological climate. It is interesting that while many environmentalists vie to decrease carbon emissions, they are also opposed to fracking. In truth, natural gas may be one of the greatest boons to keep America energized at low cost with fewer emissions. Given secure property rights and market transparency it can be environmentally friendly, to boot.
Cross-posted at Environmental Trends.
Today’s decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA is quite significant for environmental law. The court turned away the state and industry challenges to the EPA’s decision to begin regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The only element of the decision that is at all surprising is the court’s dismissal of the challenges to the EPA’s “tailoring rule” due to a lack of standing.
On the merits, the court rejected challenges to the EPA’s determination that the emission of greenhouse gases causes or contributes to air pollution that which may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare (the “endangerment finding”) and rejected claims that the EPA’s new standards for GHG emissions from mobile sources were arbitrary and capricious. This was to be expected. As I’ve noted before, judicial review of these sorts of decisions is highly deferential, and the EPA did not have to do much to support its decision. Even if the industry challengers had been able to convince the court that climate change is not that big of a deal, this would not have been enough to overturn the endangerment finding, provided the EPA gave a sufficient explanation of its conclusions — which it did.
The more interesting parts of the opinion concern whether the petitioners could challenge the EPA’s decision to regulate stationary source GHG emissions generally, and the EPA’s adoption of the tailoring rule in particular. On the former question, the court concluded that industry petitioners could challenge a decades-old EPA determination that the regulation of a pollutant from mobile sources under Section 202 of the Act triggers stationary source regulations. This was because there were some plaintiffs who had never-before been subject to stationary source regulation under the Clean Air Act because it was not until carbon dioxide was treated as a pollutant that these plantiffs emitted enough of a regulated substance to fall within the Act’s controls.
This small victory on ripeness was but a prelude to a loss on a larger question: Whether large emitters of greenhouse gases could challenge the EPA’s decision to forego regulation of smaller sources. No, the court concluded, because the industry petitioners did not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate someone else. However great the injury some industry groups may suffer from GHG regulation, the court reasoned, forcing the EPA to regulate additional sources would provide no meaningful redress. It does not matter that the EPA’s tailoring rule flatly contradicts the plain text of the Clean Air Act and represents a dramatic assertion of agency discretion over a detailed, legislatively crafted scheme. If there’s no standing, the suit cannot proceed.
This decision will be the last stop for most, if not all, of the industry challenges to the GHG rules. En banc and cert petitions may get filed, but I can’t see either the full D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court having much interest in the endangerment finding or the EPA’s mobile source rules. If any claim has a chance to go on, it would be the standing argument. If there’s an issue in this case that could catch the Supreme Court’s attention, this would be it. Among other things, it could giver the Supreme Court the opportunity to address how recent standing decisions affect standing claims based upon alleged competitive harm (i.e. the harm suffered by company A due to the government’s favorable treatment of company B). Still, I would not bet on it. In all likelihood those who oppose GHG regulation under the Clean Air Act will have to direct their attention to Congress. They’re done in the courts.
Cross-posted at the Volokh Conspiracy.
Will 2012 provide a repeat of 2012? Specifically, will the Supreme Court’s October 2012 term find the Supreme Court repeatedly reversing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in environmental cases as it did in the October 2008 term? In 2008, the Supreme Court heard an unusually high number of environmental cases, six: Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Summers v. Earth Island Inst., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council,Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States and Shell Oil Co. v. United States (the latter two of which were consolidated). In all of these cases, the side favored by environmental groups had prevailed below, and in all of these cases the Supreme Court reversed. Equally notable, however, was that all but one of these cases (Entergy) came from the Ninth Circuit. To some the Supreme Court’s October 2008 term showed the Roberts Court lacked sympathy for environmentalist positions. To others, it was further evidence the Ninth Circuit was out of step on environmental issues.
2012 could provide a repeat of 2008 because the Supreme Court is being asked to grant cert in several cases from the Ninth Circuit that are potential outliers in environmental law. As Richard Frank notes at Legal Planet, the Court will consider the such cases in tomorrow’s conference – Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn. v. Goldstene, Georgia-Pacific West, Inc. v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (along with Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, another petition from the same case), and Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council – all three of which have been identified among SCOTUSBlog’s “Petitions to Watch.” Of note, the Solicitor General has recommended against cert in all three cases even though the Department of Justice believes the Ninth Circuit was wrong all three times. According to the SG, each decision was wrong, but not cert-worthy.
In the normal course of affairs, an SG brief recommending against cert is a likely indicator that the Supreme Court will deny certiorari. Yet that has not been the practice of late in environmental cases. The Supreme Court has taken quite a few environmental cases in which the federal government lost below but nonetheless urged the Court to take pass, including Entergy, Coeur Alaska,Monstanto v. Geerston Farms, and Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy. It’s almost as if the Roberts Court does not trust the judgment of the SG’s office as to whether environmental cases are cert worthy.
Among the cases on the docket for tomorrow, Georgia-Pacific West v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center is worth some attention. In this case, the Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA’s judgment that stormwater runoff from timber roads do not need NPDES permits under the Clean Water Act. This decision overturned years of settled practice, and industry’s cert petitions have been joined by numerous state and local government amici. The petition has even gotten a boost from a somewhat unlikely source: Judge Milan Smith of the Ninth Circuit. In a flowery en banc dissent in another case, Karuk Tribe of California v. USFS, Judge Smith identified the Ninth Circuit’s decision on logging roads as one of several wrong-headed opinions from his court. Given the timing of his dissent (excerpted below the fold), it’s hard not to read it as a cert petition from the bench. Monday we should learn if the Supreme Court heeded Judge Smith’s call — and perhaps whether the Ninth Circuit is due for another environmental correction. [Read more…]
The May issue of Outdoor Life carried an article entitled “Can I Fish This Stream?” It included a map of the U.S. showing 45 states with “limited stream access,” 4 with “pending access litigation,” and 1 with “liberal stream access.” The one was Montana, about which the article’s author opined, “Anglers in other states should be so fortunate.” Not so fast.
Since the original stream access cases in the early 1980s, landowners have claimed that the court and the legislature took property rights without compensation. Not surprisingly, the conflict has torn the social fabric of landowner-sportsman relations in Montana.
What the author failed to note was the unintended consequences of Montana’s law, namely landowners who cannot prevent access have less incentive to preserve habitat. The now infamous Mitchell Slough case in southwest Montana illustrates what can happen. When anglers took the right to control access from landowners and created public access to the reclaimed irrigation ditch paid for by landowner dollars, owners rightfully shut off the flow leaving fish high and dry. Not only did this reduce spawning habitat for trout that previously migrated freely into the Bitterroot River over which public access has never been questioned, it reduced the incentive of other landowners to invest in such reclamation projects.
The Outdoor Life article concludes that “although Montanans were able to ward off impingement of their access rights last fall, it’s not likely that the assaults on stream and river accessibility are over.” Proponents of unlimited access fail to recognize that their assault on landowner rights is also an assault on trout habitat.
Access unlimited, yes; trout unlimited, no.
On May 20, 1862, Abraham Lincoln signed the Homestead Act, an effort by the U.S. government to make 160 acres available to anyone who would move to unclaimed territory, build a cabin, farm the land, and live there for five years. Eventually 270 million acres were privatized by the process, ushering in the great era of “free land.” Now, 150 years later, we have the opportunity to look at homesteading as it actually worked.
Throughout the nineteenth century the federal government was committed to disposing of the vast acreage that it owned. The privatization process was important for the growth of the market economy. But the homesteading process was a wasteful way of creating private rights, and the land sales that preceded homesteading were a much less wasteful method.
There were several problems with the original Homestead Act and its subsequent alterations. The original provision of 160 acres was insufficient for agriculture in the arid west, and even when it was expanded to 320 acres in 1909 and 640 acres in 1916 it still did not provide enough acreage to support a family in most of the places where people settled. In fact, only 40 percent of those who started the homestead process were able stick it out and finalize their claims.
An even more important lesson is that it is very difficult for the government to give away almost anything for free. In the case of homesteading, much of the land available was beyond the “profitable frontier,” the point at which the lack of a market for agricultural products made settlement unprofitable. But settlers knew the land was going to be valuable at some point in the future so they raced into the West, making their claims as early as they possibly could in order to have secure property rights when the returns from the land turned positive.
People bid for the land not with money but with wasted resources, the time and effort they put into “proving up” their claims in anticipation of future profits. Many families suffered years of deprivation trying to eke out a living until they could make their claim profitable or, once they had established property rights, buying out someone else in order to obtain an operation large enough to survive.
Think of what would happen if your institution announced that it was running a budget surplus and that on June 1st $1000 would be given to the first 20 people who lined up outside the CFO’s office. People would calculate how much time they could spend standing in line in order to get $1000 and, in the limit, $20,000 would leave your organization’s coffers. But almost no benefit would be bestowed on the recipients. People would be quite willing to spend $900 of their time in order to get $1000. Some would spend $999.
The other problem with the homesteading process was that it was so costly and difficult to use that much of the western United States remained as public lands. Today, more than half of the land in the West is under federal ownership. These lands have been subject to environmental and financial mismanagement, as documented by PERC’s Holly Fretwell.
Thus the Homestead Acts had two unfortunate results: 1) the process was an unduly costly way to dispose of federal lands and 2) because of the unworkability of homesteading much of the land was never privatized.
Last Saturday was roundup and branding day at my ranch in the Madison River Valley, about 20 miles west of Bozeman. Neighbors came to help and I put the P J (my registered brand) on the left side of my calves. As I carefully placed the irons on each calf (yes, they are hot, and yes, there is short term pain but it seems to subside quickly) I was reminded of why branding came to work so well in the West.
In the old West a statewide registration of brands developed rapidly. Often a brand registration system was one of the first pieces of legislation a territory would pass (for more details, see Anderson and Hill’s The Not So Wild, Wild West). Those registrations continue today. You can go to the Montana Brand Registry and find that if a cow has a P on the left rib and a J on the left hip, that cow belongs to the P J Ranch. Or, a PJ on the left shoulder of a horse establishes my clear claim to that horse. I can issue you a bill of sale if you buy one of my horses or cows, and that serves a proof of a legitimate transfer of rights.
This system works well for the people in white hats, my neighbors who want to know who a stray belongs to, and against those in black hats, the rustlers who might want to steal my livestock. The state maintains the registration and enforces ownership claims. And I can use the existing court system to enforce my property rights.
Branding cattle and horses carries important lessons for environmental problems, namely that we should move towards greater branding of transitory resources, particularly air and water. This would help both the white hats, people who behave responsibly, and constrain the black hats, the villains that dump their waste on other people’s property. PERC has outlined how this can be done with marine fisheries, water markets, and other resources, but, unfortunately, environmental regulations have focused more on command and control than on lowering the costs of measuring and monitoring pollution. If only a fraction of the money that is spent on formulating, enforcing, and complying with environmental regulations was devoted to developing branding technology we would be much better off.
Atrazine is a common chemical used to control broad leaf weeds. Its widespread application in the Midwest has caused concern over its presence in drinking water. Should atrazine be banned, as it has been in most of Europe? Used correctly, atrazine is a cheap way of lowering the cost of food production. Instead of banning it, why not brand it? One could require every user to of atrazine to have, at the time of purchase, a particular tracer placed in his or her container of pesticide. A registration of users would be maintained by the state. Then if levels of atrazine in drinking water exceed a specified level, those harmed (and proof of harm is an important part of common law remedies) could take those responsible to court.
Of course the use of tracers must be coupled with a common-sense understanding that “the dose makes the poison.” We now have the ability to measure extremely minute amounts of potentially harmful chemicals in our air and water. The fact that atrazine may be measured in ground water doesn’t necessarily mean harm has been done. If one of my cows sticks her head through the fence and eats a mouthful of grass, I may owe my neighbor a couple of pennies. But my neighbor shouldn’t be able to shut down my entire ranching operation.
Notice that branding doesn’t remove the state from the scene, but instead focuses its coercive power on the definition and enforcement of property rights, which penalizes those who act irresponsibly and rewards those who don’t infringe on the property rights of others. Having my cattle branded reduces the transaction costs of running a responsible ranching operation. Branding pesticides and herbicides would have the same positive effect on environmental quality.
Mike and Chantell Sackett were stuck. Complying with EPA demands meant paying to throw away their property. If they ignored the EPA they would be liable for massive fines that would obviously bankrupt them and they could be subject to criminal liability.
The Sacketts bought a lot near Priest Lake in northern Idaho in 2005 for $23,000. They planned to build a home on the site pictured above in an area with many houses already. Homes and a road existed between their lot and the lake, which is 500 feet away. They rounded up needed permits and began work in the subdivision.
The EPA uncovered this assault on a bit of dirt and in 2007 declared their lot was a wetland. The Sacketts were ordered to cease construction on the half-acre parcel. EPA told them the area was a wetland that could not be changed without its permission. It ordered them to remove the gravel that had been dumped on the lot (at a cost of $27,000), to restore the vegetation to what existed previously, to fence off the property, and to file annual reports about the condition of the property. The Sacketts were threatened with fines up to $32,500 per day until they were in compliance and ceased the wanton environmental destruction. (EPA also claims the right to double the fine to $75,000 per day when it prevails—and it declared that it had prevailed because it said it had prevailed.)
The Sacketts sued, seeking a declaration that the property was not a wetland. It is not on the lakeshore and has no creek running through it. It gets wet only when it rains. The federal district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Sacketts could not go to court until the EPA requested a federal court to enforce their order. The courts held that courts could not review compliance orders of the EPA and that there was no violation of the Sacketts’ due process rights.
The Pacific Legal Foundation took the case to the Supreme Court for them, arguing that they had the right to have the matter heard in federal court. Reversing another decision from the Ninth Circuit, the Court held unanimously for the Sacketts. The Court did not address the wetland issue. The point of the case is one of administrative procedure.
The Court held that the Sacketts had the right to contest the EPA order as “arbitrary” and “capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The EPA deprived them of their due process right. Since the EPA order was a “final agency action” the Sacketts had the right to go to court to challenge the agency. There was no other remedy. Courts can review the actions of agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure that its requirements have been followed properly by the agency. The agency cannot simply declare victory, impose fines, and the party subject to the ruling have no chance to appeal to the courts.
While the Sacketts gained satisfaction and a bit of fame from a Supreme Court win, don’t bet they ever get to build their house. Unless EPA rolls over, the Sacketts have merely won an administrative point. It may be back to the same agency and courts that spit on them before.
Some years ago beachfront property owners in California and South Carolina won noteworthy victories against state agencies that basically took their property via the regulatory process. The agencies were not pleased that mere citizens embarrassed them before the high court and then drug the parties through the administrative mud for years after the high court decisions. The final results were not the “victories” for the abused citizens that we tend to presume. Agencies have the taxpayer purse to finance their proceedings and more litigation. Homeowners such as the Sacketts have pockets a bit less deep.
As Justice Alito noted in this case [PDF], “real relief” must come from Congress. The Clean Water Act does not contain clear rules regarding procedure. No one really knows what is a wetland. The EPA takes advantage of the lack of clarity and, like any bureaucracy, grabs power. This is the 40th anniversary of the Clean Water Act. As Congress has not seen fit to clean it up over the decades, it is unlikely to do so now.